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“Lock-in” Effect of Emission Standards and Its Impact on the Choice 
of Market Based Instruments 
Abstract:  
A country’s existing emission standard policy will lead to a “lock in” effect. When the country 
plans to adopt new market-based instruments to control greenhouse gas emissions, it must 
consider this effect as it chooses among instruments to avoid larger efficiency loss. In this paper, 
we find that the “lock in” effect will cause a kink point to occur on the marginal abatement cost 
(MAC) curve. This change of shape for the MAC curve reminds us to be cautious in choosing 
market-based instruments when applying Weitzman’s rule. We also introduce this concept into a 
dynamic multi-regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for China and simulate 
MAC curves for all regions. After applying Weitzman’s rule, we propose a timeline for 
introducing price instruments under different marginal benefit (MB) curve scenarios. 
Keywords:  
Lock-in Effect, Marginal Abatement Cost Curve, Cap and Trade of Carbon Emissions Rights, 
Carbon Tax 
 
I. Introduction 
To tackle climate change and environmental degradation, China has already implemented a few 
mandatory policies to disentangle its economic growth from the rapid expansion of greenhouse 
gas emissions. Intensity regulation has been implemented in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) 
to reduce energy-related CO2 emissions per unit of economic output by 17% from 2010 levels. 
Another intensity target is the Copenhagen commitment by which carbon intensity would be 
reduced by “40%-45%” in 2020 from the level in 2005. One great step beyond the existing 
intensity targets is the latest official announcement from China stating its intent to peak its overall 
GHG emission before 2030. As a fast-growing emerging economy, China has realized the need to 
optimize social abatement costs by introducing more market-based policy instruments beyond 
traditional command-control policies. However, in this paper we show that the existing intensity 
standard will cause a policy “lock in” effect, which will make it difficult to choose among 
market-based instruments. 
The “lock in” effect results when firms in one region adopt particular clean technologies to 
achieve the existing intensity standard. This “lock in” effect distorts firms’ optimal behaviour and 
leads to a change in the shape of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve. In this paper, we 
show that a kink point will occur on the MAC curve. According to Weitzman (1974), the relative 
slopes of the MAC curve and the marginal benefit (MB) curve are the main determinant in 
choosing between price and quantity instruments under uncertainty. Thus, the kink point of the 
MAC curve becomes a quite important factor in choosing appropriate instruments. 
II. China’s choice of market based instruments 
Among market-based policy instruments, cap and trade and carbon tax are the two most prevalent. 
The former controls the quantity of total carbon emissions and the latter controls the price per unit. 
Given that both of these policies have pros and cons, addressing how to design an appropriate 
policy regime in contemporary China is urgent. There is little domestic experience to learn from, 
partly because of the imperfect environmental tax system and the lack of a mature emissions 
trading system. Moreover, there is no consensus from experiences in developed countries about 
cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness nor are there even well acknowledged efficiency impacts from 
the two policies. Therefore, price or quantity control is worth validating in China’s low-carbon 
policy regimes. 
Theoretically, emissions trading and a carbon tax are equal in a competitive market with 
symmetrical information, and they can both reach the Pareto optimal result. However, the 
theoretical prediction is violated by many uncertainties arising from market conditions. Weitzman 
(1974) states that the choice of quantity and price control measures is dependent on the relative 
slope of the marginal cost curve and the marginal benefit curve of emission reduction. Therefore，
uncertainties with the supply and demand behaviour of emission-reduction activities should be 
considered when choosing whether to control price or quantity in pollution mitigation practices. In 
China’s domestic context, the appropriate policy tool with the least loss of economic efficiency 
must take these uncertainty factors into consideration for at least three reasons. Firstly, because 
China is in a stage of economic structural transformation, the dynamics of industrial upgrading 
and relocation strengthen the uncertainties of emission-abatement activities. Secondly, regional 
disparities across China are prominent sources of uncertainty because the more than 30 provinces 
have distinct economic structures, resource endowments and market conditions. Any unified low 
carbon policy scheme at the national level would mean different abatement costs in each province. 
Last but not least, the existing command and control policy—i.e., an in-place mandatory emission 
intensity target in each region—has some policy induced “lock-in effects”1 with regard to 
low-carbon technology implementation and innovation. Abatement cost paths drive the pattern of 
costs and benefits for abatement activities in the short and long run and would distort the process 
of choosing a policy. Because all of these factors influence emission-abatement activities in 
various ways, the characteristics of marginal abatement cost curves should be investigated 
carefully to develop more appropriate low-carbon policies in China. 
As pointed out by Weizmann (1974, 1978), the comparative advantages of policy instruments are 
critically depend on slopes of marginal benefit curve and marginal cost curve.2 That is, if the 
absolute value of the slope of the MB curve is less than the absolute value of the slope of the 
MAC curve, then price control policies (such as a carbon tax) will be more efficient than quantity 
control policies (such as cap and trade). Otherwise, the quantity control policies will be more 
efficient and the difference in efficiency will increase with the increase in the difference between 
the two slopes. Stranlund and Ben-Haim (2008) extended Weitzman’s model to the situation with 
unstructured uncertainty, finding that the rule proposed by Weitzman still holds. In addition, this 
rule has been used by many researchers in both simulation and empirical analysis (Pizer, 1999, 
2002; Parry et al., 1999). Shinkuma and Sugeta (2016) extends the comparison of policies to 
long-term period and find Weitzman’s rule does not always hold when there exists entry costs of 
firms and asymmetric information. In their analytic general equilibrium model, when entry costs 
are low, magnitude of asymmetry information is large and the size of output market is large, then 
an ETS is superior to a tax scheme even when Weitzman’s condition for the superiority of taxes is 
                                                             
1 In existing economic literature, “lock-in effect” is mostly referred to “technology lock-in effect” which is a 
form of economic path dependence whereby the market selects a technological standard. In context of this paper, 
“lock-in effect” is defined as a path dependence of emission abatement effort caused by mandatory emission 
intensity target policy, which is called policy induced “lock-in effect”. 
2
 Theoretically, price instrument and quantity instrument are equal if there is no uncertainties. However, 
factors such as external shocks, asymmetric information and biased estimation will all bring uncertainties to get 
exact marginal benefit and marginal cost functions, Weitzman’s rule is particular instructive in practical. 
met. 
Currently, the academic consensus is that the shape of the MB curve is relatively flat. Kolstad 
(1996) finds that each year’s greenhouse gas emissions contribute very little to global warming 
and that the negative effect of global warming is caused mainly by the total stock of greenhouse 
gas emissions. In this case, different climate policies will not change the MB curve greatly in a 
short period of time. 
MAC curve is first applied to estimate cost for global warming abatement since 1991 (Jackson, 
1991). And, henceforth, MAC curve has become a common tool to study global warming issues. 
However, derivation of MAC curve can be divided into two types, one is expert based curves or 
technology cost curves and another is model-derived curves. (Kesicki, 2011) Expert based MAC 
curve one can provide extensive technological details for reducing emissions. (McKinsey & 
Company, 2007) However, this kind of curve cannot represent feedbacks of macroeconomics. 
Model-derived MAC curve can be further devided into two group, one is derived from bottom-up 
models which contain detailed energy technologies (Vuuren et al., 2004; Chen, 2005; Kesicki, 
2012) and another is derived from top-down models which allow macroeconomic feedbacks. 
(Dellink, 2004; Klepper and Peterson, 2006; Morris et al., 2012) The latter group of MAC curves 
is more suitable to assess total social welfare by taking all responses from producers and 
consumers as well as governments into consideration. (Klepper and Peterson, 2006) 
McKitrick (1999) proposes a new class of MAC curve that may contain a kink point. He uses a 
partial equilibrium model to analyse a firm’s optimal behaviour when there is an emission 
constraint. In his model, the firm has two ways to reduce emissions; one is to conduct abatement 
activities and the other is to reduce output directly. In the optimal solution, the firm will make a 
trade-off between the costs of the two methods and cause a kink point in the MAC curve. This 
result plays an important role in the selection of climate policies. Moreover, although McKitrick 
defines marginal abatement cost as marginal effect to profit by reducing last unit of emission in 
firm level, his model can be readily extended and applied to a general equilibrium framework to 
include more economy wide feedbacks. 
In this paper, we extend McKitrick’s model by introducing an emission intensity constraint. We 
find that an existing emission intensity constraint causes a “policy lock-in effect” and changes a 
firm’s marginal output costs by an implicit output subsidy. We then introduce this mechanism into 
our CGE model to simulate dynamic MAC curves for all regions in China from 2007 to 2020. The 
article is organized as follows: Section 3 introduces the McKitrick model extension that will be 
integrated into the CGE model; Section 4 describes the framework of the dynamic multi-regional 
general equilibrium model; Section 5 gives the simulation results of regional dynamic MAC 
curves from 2007 to 2020; Section 6 conducts a robustness test of the CGE model considering 
uncertainties; Section 7 describes the conclusions and offers policy suggestions. 
The main purpose of this paper is to add some numerical proofs for choosing between carbon tax 
and cap and trade systems in China. By examining the relationships between regional marginal 
abatement cost curves and emission reduction targets in the current Chinese policy context, this 
paper intends to shed some light on the ambiguous conditions for policy choice at the more 
disaggregated regional level. 
 
III.  An extended model of the kinked regional MAC Curve 
In McKitrick's model, firms own profit-maximizing behaviour in a complete competitive market, 
and a new variable is added into the firms’ cost functions to represent emission abatement activity. 
This micro-level analysis can also be applied to industry-level analysis if the conditions of the 
Klein-Nataf aggregation problem are satisfied. Klein (1946) stated that if the first-order conditions 
of individual firms are satisfied, then the aggregate production function must satisfy the same 
first-order conditions. Nataf (1948) showed that such an aggregate production function exists if 
and only if every firm’s production function is additively separable in inputs. Therefore, as long as 
firms have production functions with this separability feature, we can apply the analysis to 
aggregate production at the industry level. For industrial sectors, each sector maximizes its profit: 
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subscript i represents different regions involved in emission reduction. pi is price for output, yi is 
output level. wi is a vector including input factors and their prices. ai represents the abatement 
activities these regions take to reduce emissions, and it satisfies ai ≥ 0. So ai can be any form 
which represents the above economic meaning. For example, if we define emission intensity as 
1/ai, then it means increase in abatement activity ai will reduce emission intensity level. ci is cost 
function of wi, yi and ai. ei is emission function of yi and ai. We also assume that cy > 0, cyy > 0, ey > 
0, eyy ≥ 0, ea < 0 and eaa < 03. 
The marginal abatement cost is then defined as the derivative of profit (π) with respect to the 
target emission level. In the optimal solution, we can obtain the marginal abatement cost when 
ca(w,y,0)>0 at a=0 as: 
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 (2) 
ei,kink is the emission level when kink point occur and e* is unregulated emission level. Here, 
abatement activity ai can be either the investment in new equipment to reduce emissions or the 
costs related to developing new energy-saving technologies, such as human resources, materials 
and R&D costs. As shown in McKitrick’s analysis, the property of the first derivative of the cost 
function with respect to abatement activity at point a=0 decides whether a kink point will occur on 
the MAC curve. When ca(w,y,0)>0, the zero lower bound of abatement activity will not ensure that 
the first part in the bracket on the right side of second expression in equation (2) will always be 
zero, thus the shape of the MAC curve changes. At this time, formula of MAC curve turn into first 
expression in equation (2). When ca(w,y,0)=0, the initial abatement activity is costless, and 
therefore the region is free to adjust the abatement activity when it faces a specific emission target. 
However, when ca(w,y,0)>0, the initial abatement activity is quite costly; therefore the region can 
only increase this abatement activity when it faces a rather tight emission target. Consequently, the 
kink point of the MAC curve occurs. 
To apply this framework in a large-scale simulation model, we must first set the form of emission 
constraint explicitly in equation (1). In reality, the most common policy linking abatement activity 
with emission is the emission intensity target at the regional level. The emission intensity is 
defined as one region’s total emission level divided by its total output level. Here we define 
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 These assumptions are almost the same as those in McKitrick's model. The only difference is that we 
assume the second derivative of e to y can also be zero, this won’t change the results. 
“emission intensity” as e/y and set e(y,a)=y/a, then this emission intensity is an endogenous 
variable solved by equilibrium conditions. Following above definitions, we can describe the 
relationship between emission, output, abatement activity and the intensity target as: 
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Inti is region i’s emission intensity target. We call this emission intensity as “emission intensity 
imposed by policy”, which is an exogenous parameter. Equation (3) is a traditional Kun-Tucker 
problem and we can see that one region’s abatement activity input is bounded by its emission 
intensity target Inti. If one region sets a higher policy target that leads to a lower emission intensity, 
then the minimum abatement activity input level becomes higher. 
When substituting equation (3) into (1) and applying the envelope theorem, we can clearly see the 
implicit output subsidy effect that lowers the marginal output cost4, i.e., the cost of one method 
that can reduce emissions. This happens only if equation (3) is binding, which is described as the 
policy induced “lock-in” effect. When equation (3) is not binding, the emission intensity constraint 
will not affect a firm’s behaviour; thus there is no output subsidy effect. 
The behaviour of abatement activity in equation (3) is consistent in the general equilibrium setting, 
which means that abatement activity increases as absolute emissions decrease. In CGE model, 
there are no exact abatement activities5, so all abatement activity changes are realized through 
substitution effect and cost structure effect. To see this, we take the production function in CES 
form and the first order conditions, which give the conditional factor demand function as: 
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4
 The envelope theorem indicates that marginal output cost is Cy=cy-λInt, which is lower than cy if there is 
no emission intensity constraint. This method is also used in Holland (2012) to show the implicit output subsidy 
effect of emission intensity standards. 
5
 CGE model is a top-down model using aggregate production technology assumption used in economic 
theory. This assumption is quite different from production technology assumptions used in most bottom-up models 
which may contain hundreds of detailed production technologies. 
efi is the emission coefficient of energy input Ei in region i. θj is the cost share of input j, and pj is 
the price of input j. σ is the elasticity of substitution of inputs.6 Then the change in emission 
intensity is: 
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  (5) 
Equation (5) shows that the change in intensity depends on the changes in relative prices, d(pj/pE) 
and the cost share of different inputs. This means that emission intensity will decrease as long as 
energy input is substitutable to other inputs. This effect will be magnified if the cost share of 
energy input increases. 
 
Figure 1 Mechanism of the occurrence of a kink point 
Figure 1 illustrates the mechanism of the kink point concept in a large-scale simulation model. If 
one region has no intensity target, i.e., a pure null scenario, then the emission reduction efforts 
allow for unconstrained inputs of abatement activities, which correspond to a smooth dotted line 
in the figure. However, if one region initially had an emission intensity standard (e.g., I*), then the 
abatement activity would be bounded at certain level greater than zero, as indicated in the solid 
line in this figure. This level of abatement activity corresponds to an inelastic effort other than the 
output change needed to achieve the intensity target. Once absolute emission E* was further 
reduced to a certain level such as E**, then the abatement activity would increase along with the 
solid line. 
                                                             
6
 We make a simplified assumption here that there is only one type of energy input. 
From Figure 1, we can see that the position of the kink point depends on three elements. The first 
is the intensity target level: a lower intensity level will lead to a later occurrence of the kink point. 
The second element is the initial emission intensity level: if one region is originally energy 
intensive, then it will lead to a later occurrence of the kink point. The third element is the rate of 
decrease in true emission intensity level, which is related to abatement activity; this factor is 
affected by a region’s relative price of inputs and cost share of inputs. 
IV. The dynamic regional computable general equilibrium model 
1. Model data 
This paper builds a recursive dynamic multi-regional CGE model of China. The model uses The 
2007 Regional Input – Output Table (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011) as the baseline 
to calibrate. It includes 30 regions (all provinces, cities and autonomous regions, except the Tibet 
and Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan regions). Each region includes 42 production sectors that 
correspond to the 42 sectors in the input-output table, one government and one representative 
household sector. Capital and labour are the only two endowment factors used in the model. The 
model is written in GAMS and uses MPSGE subsystems to obtain the entire equation system. 
 
Rectangular Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
A key problem with using an MPSGE subsystem is that we must first build a dataset called 
rectangular SAM (Rutherford, 1998), This dataset is just a different version transformed from 
conventional SAM table and it is also micro consistent that both row sums and column sums are 
zero.7 We use a cross entropy method proposed by Robinson and El-Said (2000) to obtain the 
balanced rectangular SAM table based on The 2007 Regional Input – Output Table. 
 
Inter-regional trade matrix 
Another important problem in building a regional CGE model is building an inter-regional trade 
matrix dataset. First, we use the gravity model to estimate the raw interregional trade matrix based 
on regional inflow and outflow data. Then, the cross entropy method is used again to balance the 
extended rectangular SAM table, which includes the above raw interregional trade matrix. Finally, 
                                                             
7 More detailed description of rectangular SAM table can be obtained from GAMS/MPSGE manual. 
(Rutherford, 1998) 
we obtain a consistent dataset to build the regional CGE model. 
 
Emission data 
In this model, CO2 emission in each period is calculated by multiplying inputs of five energy 
types8 and adjusted emission factors. This process is constituted of two steps. First, emissions of 
different energy types in each region are calculated by the multiplication of final energy 
consumption data from energy balance table and default emission factor obtained from IPCC 
Carbon Inventory Accounting Guidelines. Next, we divide emission by energy inputs measured in 
monetary term in benchmark input-output table to get adjusted emission factors. These adjusted 
emission factors are assumed to keep constant during whole periods from 2007 to 2020. 
 
2. Basic modules 
The basic modules of the regional CGE model include a production module, a demand module, an 
energy/emission module and an interregional trade module. 
 
Production 
The production module employs nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
functions to specify substitution possibilities in production between capital, labour, energy and 
intermediate inputs. At the top level, intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions, and they 
are aggregated with energy and a value-added composite of capital and labour. 
According to equation (3), we introduce two new endogenous variables into the energy composite 
production procedure. One represents emission permits used in fixed proportions with different 
energy inputs. Revenues from these emission permits are cycled back to regional households. 
Another variable is the endogenous emission intensity, which is the inverse of abatement activity. 
 
Final consumption demand 
The utility function of the representative consumer in each region is given as a constant elasticity 
of transmission (CET) function, which consists of total consumption and net savings: 
  
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,
max ln 1 lnr r r
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  (6) 
                                                             
8 Five energy types are coal, crude oil, natural gas, petroleum product and electricity. 
WLFr is region r’s total residential consumption; SAVr is region r’s net saving; η is the share of 
consumption. 
Total residential consumption, government consumption and investment demand within each 
region are all in the form of combined consumption of a CES energy aggregate and a CES 
non-energy consumption bundle. 
 
Budget constraint 
A household’s total income comes from capital income, labour income, government transfer 
payments and revenue from emission permits. The government’s total income comes from tax 
revenue. 
 
Interregional trade 
The interregional trade module assumes that each region follows small-country behaviour within 
an international trade market, which means that prices of import and export goods are all 
exogenous. While in the domestic market, each region follows big-country behaviour, meaning 
that each region is no longer a price taker but can affect the domestic price through its 
interregional trade volume. 
For non-energy goods, a three-level nested CES demand function is used to specify substitution 
possibilities among goods from foreign countries, other domestic regions and the local market: 
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CONSi represents the total consumption of non-energy good I; subscript r stands for the different 
regions. α and θ are share coefficients of different input goods. The Armington elasticity of 
substitution among goods from different sources is represented by φ, ρ and δ. INF and IMP stand 
for the interregional flow of goods and import goods, respectively. 
We assume that energy goods from different countries and regions are homogeneous due to the 
high degree of standardization; therefore, the energy demand function is a standard CES function: 
  
1
1 4e e e er er e er
CONS DS INF IMP

    

       (8) 
ε is elasticity of substitution among different sources. 
 
3. Interregional capital flow module 
In this model, we use the putty-clay capital assumption to differentiate capital. This means that 
once free capital is used to form durable goods, it cannot be converted back again. Thus, only 
newly formed capital in each period has the ability to flow across sectors and regions. Therefore, 
the adjustment of industrial structures and the relocation of industries can only be completed 
gradually by the depreciation of capital stock and the flow of newly formed free capital. Each 
region’s total investment is determined by the total savings in the last period, which is the 
neoclassic macro-closure condition. Finally, the flow patterns of newly formed capital are 
determined by the difference among each region’s rate of return of capital. In this model, we use 
the logit function proposed by Dixon (2012) in the MONASH Model to describe the relationship 
between the rate of return and the growth rate of capital stock: 
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,
k
r ig  is the expected growth rate of the capital stock of sector i in region r. k
ig
, 
k
ig  and 
k
ig
stand for the upper bound, lower bound and equilibrium level of the capital growth rate of each 
sector, and we take the value as 0.3, 0 and 0.16, respectively. RI stands for the equilibrium value of 
the rate of return on capital, which is calculated from the 2007 Input - Output Table. Figure 2 
depicts the relationship between the expected return on capital ( eRI ) and the growth rate of 
capital accumulation ( ,
k
r ig ) with the form of logit function. 
 
Figure 2 Relationship between capital accumulation and expected rate of return 
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4. Interregional labour flow module 
Another important characteristic of this model is that labour can flow among regions, and the 
degree of interregional labour flow is determined by each region’s total labour supply in the 
previous period, wage differences among regions and other exogenous parameters. Because 
value-added data for rural labour and urban labour are not separated in China’s input-output table, 
this model assumes that there is only one type of labour. 
The pattern of labour flow is captured by the extended Lewis model, which takes incomplete 
labour flow into consideration. Thus, the labour transfer equation is set as:  
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t represents the year; subscript d and subscript r stand for the local and the targeted region, 
respectively. LMtd,r stands for the amount of labour transferred from the local region to region r in 
period t, and it is in proportion to the total labour force Lt-1d of the local region in period t-1. Wd 
and Wr represent the real wage in two regions. μd,r stands for the differences in the labour quality 
of two regions; we set μd,r equal to one in this model. md,r represents the cost of labour migration in 
the form of a certain percentage of the wage level in the targeted region; we assume md,r equals 
0.05. Finally, σ stands for the elasticity of labour transfer to capture the incomplete labour flow 
situation, and we assume σ equals 0.8. (Xu and Li, 2008) 
In equation (10), Θd,r  represents the transfer intensity coefficient of the labour flow from this 
region to the targeted province. It is a constant; therefore, it does not change over time. The 
coefficient is calculated by the data from Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the 
People’s Republic of China (2012). Φtd,r is a dummy variable that represents the existence of 
positive labour flow. When labour flow exists, the variable takes the value one, but it otherwise 
takes the value zero. 
 
5. Scenario settings 
During the years 2005 to 2010, all provinces in China made great achievements in energy savings 
and emission reductions as required by the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. Moreover, the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan announced further plans to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 18% 
and carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 17%. To implement these targets, the State Council 
released the Work Plan for Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
Period and proposed clear emission reduction targets for all regions for the years 2010 to 2015. 
China committed at the Copenhagen Conference to further promote energy savings and emission 
reductions by 2020 and to cut CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 40% as compared with 2005. 
Following these climate policies, we establish the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario of emission 
intensity targets for all regions in China from 2007 to 2020. 
In this type of BAU scenario, one should be cautious in calculating the marginal abatement cost. 
In a traditional dynamic recursive model, the dynamic behaviour of endowments and parameters 
follow several rules that are determined exogenously under a NULL scenario. Compared to the 
BAU scenario, the NULL scenario imposes no climate policy restrictions; it is clearly unsuitable 
to discuss effects without accounting for existing abatement efforts from previous years. Therefore, 
one advantage of considering existing policies is that we can explore the actual cost of policies 
that reflect dynamic changes in the economy. 
To realize this BAU scenario setting, we first define two emission intensity variables; one is the 
endogenous intensity Inttbase and another is the exogenous policy target Intt-1BAU, and 
Inttbase=Intt-1BAU. This indicates that emission intensity in year t has an upper bound of the intensity 
target in year t-1. 
For the CGE model, the entire model equation system can refer to the representation of 
Abdelkhalek and Dufour (1998): 
 
 , ,fY X β γ
  (11) 
If there are n endogenous variables in the CGE model, then Y is an endogenous variable vector of 
n×1. X is an exogenous variable vector (e.g., policy variable). β is the free parameter vector, 
and γ is the calibrated share parameter vector. We can then calculate each region’s total emissions 
in the BAU scenario in year t using: 
 
 *, 1 1, , , | ,t t t tbase t base BAU BAUf     e EF X β γ Int Int Int X
  (12) 
e*base is the j×1 vector of regional total emissions used in equation (1). EF is the j×n matrix of the 
emission coefficient of all regions. Int is the j×1 vector of emission intensity of all regions. Hence, 
we can obtain the marginal abatement costs for all regions under the constraint target: 
 
  *,, , | ,t t t tbase base BAUf   eMAC X β γ e I target e Int Int   (13) 
Here, target is a j×j diagonal matrix that represents each region’s target emission reduction rate. 
This reduction rate is set exogenously from 0 to 50% in 1% increments to simulate the MAC 
curve. Figure 3 illustrates the dynamic MAC curves in the BAU scenario. 
 
Figure 3 The dynamic MAC curve based on the BAU Scenario 
 
V. Simulation results and analyses 
1. Shapes of regional MAC curves 
Figure 4 presents the MAC curve results of two regions, Beijing and Qinghai. The figure shows 
the surface of marginal abatement costs combining two dimensions. One dimension is the years 
from 2007 to 2020 and the other dimension is an emission reduction rate from 0 to 50%. The 
MAC surfaces of all other regions look similar, with the only difference being their absolute level. 
This confirms our basic economic intuition that if one region stays at the current emission 
intensity level, then it will have no extra abatement cost, and if the emission reduction target 
becomes tighter, the result will be higher abatement costs. 
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 Figure 4 The surface charts of the dynamic MAC curves of Beijing and Qinghai 
The MAC curve of Beijing can be seen as a representative curve because most regions’ curves 
have a similar shape. However, only Qinghai’s MAC curve appears to be quite flat. We can see 
this result more clearly in Figure 5 if we depict each year’s MAC curve individually. The results 
confirm the theoretical prediction about the shape of the MAC curve: kink points will occur as the 
target becomes tighter, regardless of the slope of the MAC curves. 
 
Figure 5 Cross-sectional views of the dynamic MAC curves of Beijing and Qinghai 
Note: From bottom to top is the MAC curve under different abatement rates each year from 2007 to 2020. 
From the results shown in Figure 5, we can draw two preliminary conclusions about regional 
dynamic MAC curves. 
Firstly, the absolute level of the MAC curve increases over time. If one region faces the same 
reduction target every year, the abatement cost will go up gradually, which corresponds to 
common sense. In the BAU scenario, it becomes increasingly difficult to reduce the same 
percentage of emissions because the emission intensity constraint changes monotonically, causing 
the MAC curve to shift upward. 
Secondly, kink points occur and shift to the right over time. As shown in the theoretical model, 
there are two ways to reduce emissions: reducing output directly and increasing abatement 
activities. Each region will make a trade-off between the costs of the two choices. On the one hand, 
when the cost of reducing output exceeds the abatement activity cost, both methods will be 
adopted and thus lead to kink points. On the other hand, when the intensity target becomes stricter, 
it becomes more difficult to reduce emissions. This trend leads to an increase in the initial 
abatement activity cost, which has the potential to reduce output. As a result, the occurrence of 
kink points is delayed. 
 
 
Figure 6 The comparison between different regions’ dynamic MAC curves 
Note: Each kinked line represents one region’s MAC curve. 
 
Figure 6 shows the comparison of MAC curves among all regions for four different years. As 
mentioned previously, only the MAC curve of Qinghai Province has a quite different shape than 
those of other regions. According to equation (5), this is because Qinghai Province has a relatively 
low cost share of energy input, so the increase rate of abatement activity is also relatively low. 
This makes its MAC curve very similar to the traditional one. However, the results in Figure 6 
show that kink points occur after 2007 and that they change the shape of the MAC curves 
substantially in the years 2015 and 2020. Most kink points occur when emission reduction rates 
range from 4 to 10% in 2015 and between 5 to 15% in 2020. Most of these differences result from 
the mixed effects of the cost share of energy inputs and changes in relative prices according to 
equation (5). Different emission intensity settings in the BAU scenario also account for some of 
the differences. 
2. Making policy choices between taxes and a cap and trade system 
To support the policy choices between a tax and a cap and trade system, we need to know the 
relative importance of various factors driving the appearance of the kinked points. Based on 
equations (3) to (5), which indicate the mechanisms of the kink point, we can write the emission 
reduction rate corresponding to the kink point as a function of three types of elements: initial 
emission intensity, intensity target and energy input cost shares: 
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  (14) 
in which percentkink is the emission reduction rate corresponding to the kink point, Int is the initial 
emission intensity, and IntT is the intensity target. Share is a vector of different energy input cost 
shares, which include the cost share of coal, oil, oil products, electricity and heat. We then apply 
the Taylor expansion to equation (14) to obtain the regression equation: 
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  (15) 
Equation (15) is a panel data model, and we obtain all data needed from the simulation result of 
the CGE model. A Hausman test ruled out the null hypothesis, and thus we established the model 
as a fixed-effect model. Moreover, we estimated the model using the cross-section weighted least 
squares method. This was motivated by our intuition that regions are differentiated by many 
aspects, such as production technologies and household preferences. A White test also suggested 
that the model shows heteroscedasticity. The regression results are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Regression results of panel data 
 Coefficient 
C 
   0.089*** 
(0.034) 
Int 
 0.112** 
(0.056) 
IntT 
  -0.283*** 
(0.012) 
Shcoal 
  -3.632*** 
(0.374) 
Shoil 
   6.969*** 
(1.078) 
Shoilprod 
   0.405*** 
(0.130) 
Shele 
  0.350** 
(0.137) 
Shheat 
   8.940*** 
(2.113) 
*** and ** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Not surprisingly, the results in Table 1 indicate that a higher initial intensity target will lead to later 
occurring kink points and that a higher intensity policy target will delay the occurrence of a kink 
point. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction shown in Figure 1. 
Estimation results show that shares of different energy inputs contribute quite differently to the 
occurrence of a kink point. The negative coefficient of Shcoal indicates that an increase in the cost 
share of coal will cause the intensity curve in Figure 1 to become steeper. This change results from 
the larger substitution effect of the coal input. Consequently, this effect moves the intersect point 
leftward, which accelerates the occurrence of a kink point. However, the estimation results show 
that all other energy inputs are opposite to coal and that an increase in cost shares of these energy 
inputs will delay the occurrence of a kink point. 
VI. Policy choice analysis 
According to Weitzman’s rule, when the MAC curve appears to be relatively flat, it will be more 
efficient to adopt quantitative policies such as emission trading, whereas it will be more effective 
to adopt price policies such as a carbon tax when the MAC curve appears to be relatively steep. 
Following the simulation results in this paper, the occurrence of kink points divide the MAC curve 
into two parts—one flat and the other steep. Therefore, it is essential to take this result into 
consideration when implementing emission reduction policies. 
To apply Weitzman’s rule, we need to further identify the slope of the MB curve. There is a 
consensus that the marginal damage from greenhouse gases is constant, which means a quite flat 
MB curve. However, when facing environmental problems, people are more likely to pay attention 
to regional air pollution; this is especially true in China. As a result, when estimating the MB 
curve, the ancillary benefits of greenhouse gas reduction should also be taken into consideration. 
There are already many studies of the ancillary benefits of addressing two environmental 
problems. Some of these studies use an integrated environmental assessment model or 
sector-specific analysis to investigate the co-benefit of climate change policy and regional air 
pollution control policy. (Syri et al., 2001; Alcamo et al., 2002; Mayerhofer et al., 2002; van 
Vuuren et al., 2006; Takeshita, 2012) More recently, a few researchers have begun to study these 
co-benefits in China. Zhang et al. (2015) combine the energy conservation supply curves and the 
GAINS model to study the co-benefit in China’s cement industry. They find that energy efficiency 
measures and end-of-pipe options in China can achieve emission reductions at a relatively low 
cost. Dong et al. (2015) combine the AIM/CGE model with the GAINS model to assess 
co-benefits at China’s provincial level. They find that co-benefits exist at the provincial level and 
that regions with higher GDP will obtain higher cost-reduction co-benefits. All of these studies 
show that when the ancillary benefits of greenhouse gas reduction are considered, the new MB 
curve may not be as flat. 
Due to these uncertainties in estimating the MB curve, we set a wide range for the slope of the MB 
curve and compare the slopes of the MB and MAC curves. The comparison shows the conditions 
under which price policies dominate or at least are better than quantity policies.  
Table 2 Policy selection matrix between price policies and quantity policies 
 
Slope of MB curve, 10,000 yuan/percent 
Year 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
2007 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2008 100% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2009 100% 37% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2010 100% 57% 7% 3% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2011 100% 63% 10% 7% 7% 3% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2012 100% 77% 7% 3% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2013 100% 80% 33% 30% 30% 27% 27% 7% 3% 0% 0% 
2014 100% 97% 60% 53% 53% 50% 50% 33% 17% 10% 3% 
2015 100% 97% 83% 80% 80% 73% 67% 57% 27% 17% 7% 
2016 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 97% 77% 63% 40% 27% 13% 
2017 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 80% 67% 43% 27% 13% 
2018 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 80% 73% 43% 27% 17% 
2019 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 80% 73% 50% 27% 20% 
2020 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 83% 73% 60% 33% 20% 
 
The number in each cell of Table 2 is the percentage of regions that should enact price polices, 
according to Weitzman’s rule. The light area in Table 2 means that few regions should adopt price 
instruments, whereas the dark area means that most regions should adopt price instruments. When 
we consider the ancillary benefits of greenhouse gas reduction, the slope of the MB curve may 
become even steeper. This means that it is more likely that the real world will be located in the 
light area in Table 2. In this case, quantity instruments are definitely better than price instruments. 
Next, we assume that the slope of the MB curve is 3,000 yuan/percent. According to Weitzman’s 
rule, we then summarize the policy choices of each region in Table 3. 
Table 3 Summary of regions that should switch from a quantity policy to a price policy 
Year Regions 
2010 Hainan 
2011 Henan 
2013 Hebei, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Chongqing 
2014 Shanxi, Hubei, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Gansu, Xinjiang 
2015 Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Yunnan, Ningxia 
2016 Beijing, Tianjin, Fujian, Guangdong, Shaanxi 
2017 Qinghai 
 
The results in Table 3 show that most regions entered the “steep slope” part of the MAC curve 
between 2013 and 2014, which causes the slope of the MAC curve to become greater than that of 
the MB curve. Therefore, assuming that the slope of the MB curve is 3,000 yuan/percent, the 
simulation results suggest imposing carbon taxes rather than implementing an emission 
permit-trading scheme in all regions from 2016 to avoid extra economic efficiency loss under 
uncertainty. 
VII. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we find kink points will occur in MAC curves due to policy induced “lock-in effect" 
caused by introduction of emission intensity target policy. When imposing intensity target policy, 
"lock-in effect" restricts agents to reduce emissions only through reducing output level, that is to 
say, agents' ability to choose emission abatement effort level is locked in by emission intensity 
constraint. Under this circumstance, the choice of market based carbon policy under uncertainty 
should be decided more seriously. 
After introducing fore-mentioned kink point mechanism into a dynamic regional CGE model, we 
simulate and explore more features of each Chinese province’s MAC curve. The shapes of the 
MAC curve at the regional level also help us study the choice of carbon abatement policies based 
on the combination of this mechanism and Weitzman’s rule. 
Firstly, we find that regional MAC curves shift upward over time, which means that the increase 
in abatement cost and the difference among MAC curves also become larger after year 2015 
because the emission intensity targets grow tighter in all regions. This result is consistent with our 
common sense. 
Secondly, kink points occur on all regional MAC curves, and these kink points have very different 
characteristics. When facing an emission constraint, each region must adjust its optimal 
production behaviour by balancing the cost of abatement activity input and the cost of reducing 
output. The existence of intensity targets causes the initial abatement activity cost to be higher 
than the cost of reducing output. These high costs cause inconsistent behaviour in reducing 
emissions and lead to the occurrence of kink points in MAC curves. Moreover, each region’s 
emission intensity targets and cost share of inputs also affect the differences in kink points. 
Thirdly, the choice of price policies or quantity policies is highly dependent on the shape of the 
MB curve. Simulation results show that the positions of the kinked points of the regional MAC 
curves shift rightward over time, resulting in the actual reduction rate located to the left of the kink 
points. The slope of the MAC curve to the left of the kink point is higher than that on the right, 
indicating a higher possibility of suffering greater efficiency losses from adopting price control 
policies than from adopting quantity policies. A sensitivity analysis of the slope of the MB curve 
suggests that quantity instruments are only suitable when the MB curve is steeper than a certain 
level. 
Fourthly, the results are especially instructive for China as it is trying to build its national emission 
trading scheme while it has also announced its long-term emission intensity target. Our simulation 
results show that there are large possibilities that most regions will suffer “lock-in effect” after 
year 2015 if emission cap of national ETS remains stable or decline slowly (which means 
emission reduction rate is small). Sectors will only reduce output levels under “lock-in effect”, 
thus no technology progress or structure change will occur. To avoid this, policy makers should 
consider carefully about whether to apply both low-carbon policies to all sectors or not. Moreover, 
if both policies are used in practical, we can get two important implications from our results. First, 
settings of caps in different regions are important because levels of caps determine whether 
intensity targets take effect or not. If intensity targets take effect, there will occur distortions in 
sectors’ optimal behavior. Second, more policies such as encouraging development of low-carbon 
technologies should be introduced to change positions of kink points to avoid “lock-in effect”. 
Finally, our model can be extended to evaluate more hot debates related to carbon policies in 
further studies. First, bottom-up models can be introduced to depict low-carbon technologies and 
policy induced “lock-in” effect can thus be studied in more detail. Second, our conclusion can 
contribute to studying optimal sector coverage problems for those countries which are building 
their own emission trading schemes to avoid “lock-in effect”. 
  
VIII. Appendix 
In this section, we will perform some robustness analyses on the MAC curve. As we have already 
discussed, the choice of policy instrument is primarily determined by the kink points of MAC 
curves. The occurrence of kink points is determined by three factors: emission intensity target, 
cost share of inputs and elasticity of substitution among inputs. Uncertainties about all three 
factors may affect the equilibrium result in the CGE model. The uncertainties of the first two 
factors are related to model setting and parameter calibration, and their effect is relatively small 
because both BAU scenario settings and cost share are drawn from existing policy and real data. 
Therefore, the only uncertainty we should be concerned about is choosing free parameters such as 
the elasticity of substitution (Mansur and Whalley, 1984). 
Generally, most free parameters in the CGE model are chosen from empirical studies, at both the 
regional and industry level. However, these estimation results are highly dependent on the specific 
regression models and data used by researchers. Thus, the elasticity of substitution values used in 
the CGE model may vary across a wide range, which may cause very different equilibrium results. 
In this section, we will conduct robustness analyses of the elasticity of substitution among the 
different energies that play the most important role in this paper. 
In the CGE model, the elasticity of substitution used in the CES function ranges from zero to 
infinity. However, in most research studies, this range is zero to six, and most functions take this 
value as one, such as the Cobb-Douglas function. For this reason, it is reasonable to assume that 
the elasticity of substitution has an upper bound greater than zero. 
Several methods have been proposed to test the uncertainty of free parameters in the CGE model 
(Wigle, 1991; Harrison et al., 1993). These methods can be divided into five categories: limited 
sensitivity analysis, conditional systematic sensitivity analysis, unconditional systematic 
sensitivity analysis, Bayes’ method and the extremum method. Here, we adopt the limited 
sensitivity analysis method, which includes the elasticity of substitution among energy inputs. 
The elasticity of substitution among energies adopted in this paper is 0.5. We suppose the 
elasticity bears beta distribution σ~Be(a,b) to better represent the boundary feature (Wang & Chen, 
2006). The expectation value is 0.5 and the standard deviation is 0.3. The upper bound and lower 
bound are 0 and 2, respectively. From these conditions, we can calculate the value of two 
parameters: 
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From equation (17), we obtain a equals 11/6 and b equals 33/6. In our Monte Carlo simulation, we 
assume a 10% emission reduction rate in year 2010 in Beijing to be representative due to the 
complexity of the entire CGE model. In the simulation, we draw the elasticity of substitution from 
the beta distribution 1000 times and solve the equilibrium results each time to obtain the 
distribution of marginal abatement cost. 
 
Figure 7 Distribution of marginal abatement cost in Beijing in 2010 under a 10% emission reduction 
 
In Figure 7, the histogram is the simulation result and the solid line is the linear transformation of 
the standard beta distribution. The scale coefficients of linear transformation come from regression 
analyses of the simulation results and the elasticity of substitution drawn from beta distribution 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Result of regression analysis of the marginal abatement cost 
Regression equation: MAC = C + beta * sigma + ε 
 Constant Slope 
Estimation Value  206.791*** -9.074*** 
Standard Deviation （0.00849） （0.01444） 
*** implies it is significant at a 1% level. 
 
Table 4 Summary statistics of Monte Carlo result 
Index Real Value Sample value Fitted value 
Average 202.14 202.29 202.25 
Standard Deviation N/A 2.86 2.72 
Coefficient of Variation N/A 0.014 0.013 
 
Table 4 gives three values for the marginal abatement cost. The real value comes from the original 
CGE model, which has no standard deviation. The sample value is the average value of 1000 
simulations. The fitted value is the expected value of the linear transformed beta distribution. We 
can see that all values are very close to each other, which indicates that the sample mean value 
converges to the real value. The confidence interval of the marginal abatement cost under the 95% 
significance level is [196.03,206.21]. As a percentage, this confidence interval is [-3.0%, 2.0%], 
which is an acceptable range. Table 4 gives the corresponding confidence intervals for marginal 
abatement costs under different emission reduction target rates: 
Table 5 Corresponding errors of different carbon abatement costs 
Percentage 
Confidence Interval（95%） 
Confidence interval of 
percentage 
Lower Bound Lower Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Lower Bound 
2% 63.06 75.62 -7.6% 10.8% 
4% 129.40 132.50 -0.9% 1.4% 
6% 164.45 172.80 -2.9% 2.0% 
8% 179.94 189.14 -3.0% 2.0% 
10% 196.12 206.19 -3.0% 2.0% 
 
The results in Table 5 imply that the confidence interval converges rapidly to a stable range. In 
Beijing’s case, the actual emission reduction rate in 2010 is 9.5%, which means that the 
confidence interval of its marginal abatement cost is stable enough to make a policy choice. This 
result shows that the simulation results in our CGE model are robust and reliable.  
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